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BOOK REVIEWS
CAPITAL THINKING
American Sea Power and the Obsolescence of Capital Ship Theory, by Robert B� Watts. Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland, 2016� 232 pages� $45 (paperback)�
Even though this book is arguably not 
a comprehensive study, it deserves to 
be read by all naval professionals and 
anyone with a casual interest in the 
U�S� Navy and how it historically has 
defined its mission� I say this up front 
because, although this review will be 
critical in some areas, such observations 
must never be allowed to diminish the 
intrinsic value of works such as this: 
advocacy pieces that set out to challenge 
the prevailing (twentieth-century) naval 
orthodoxy, with all its emphasis on plat-
forms and technology� This orthodoxy is 
the proverbial elephant in the room that 
is rarely challenged in naval circles—and 
yet it should be� In this reviewer’s 
mind, therefore, it is absolutely healthy 
for naval professionals to be exposed 
constantly to such variations in thinking 
and to be pressed continually to justify 
their long-standing beliefs, even if only 
to force a more coherent exposition of 
the prevailing service position� For this 
reason alone, authors such as Watts 
provide immense value to the service�
Watts writes in an engaging and readable 
style that makes this slim paperback 
an easy and enjoyable read� The book 
breaks down naturally into three distinct 
sections: a short, theoretical analysis 
of Mahan and his effect on U�S� naval 
thought a century ago; an examination 
of how the U�S� Navy has evolved this 
thinking to meet the momentous events 
of the twentieth century, specifically 
the two world wars and the Cold War; 
and finally a look at how the Navy 
has fared in the post–Cold War era, a 
period characterized by increasingly 
complex irregular conflicts on land� 
The second section is the largest, 
forming the backbone of the book and 
containing a very useful summation of 
the various iterations of naval thinking 
and all the official strategic utterances 
since 1945, right up to the modern-day 
“air-sea battle�” Throughout it all, Watts’s 
premise is that the U�S� Navy, for a 
variety of bureaucratic and cultural 
reasons, has remained overinvested in 
what he calls the “capital ship theory,” a 
focus on high-end, expensive platforms� 
While these may offer flexibility in 
a variety of scenarios, they may in 
fact be something of a liability in this 
new age of irregular warfare�
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Watts himself is eminently qualified 
for this work� A retired captain in the 
Coast Guard and an acknowledged 
author on naval topics, he can call on 
some thirty years of observing how the 
services have grappled with the strategic 
changes in the post-Vietnam era, not 
to mention his firsthand experience 
with what some would call the more 
“irregular” missions of naval life� Not 
surprisingly, he is at his best in describ-
ing the difficulties facing the naval 
services in the post–September 11th era�
This is not to say there is no awkward-
ness in the logic Watts employs� For 
one thing, he is rather nebulous when it 
comes to the actual meaning of the term 
“capital ship�” In the text he variously 
refers to battleships and aircraft carriers 
but also on occasion to “cruisers and de-
stroyers” (p� 110) and, even more specifi-
cally, the DDG-51 class (and equivalent) 
(pp� 120, 171) as being capital ships� 
While in terms of raw combat power 
this may be somewhat understandable, 
this is not a trivial matter in this case� 
The normally accepted definition of a 
capital ship would be “one of the largest 
and most heavily armed ships in a fleet, 
usually understood to be battleships, 
battle cruisers, and aircraft carriers,” 
or words to that effect� The problem: 
including everything from the DDG-51 
on up in the definition means there are 
precious few USN vessels today that are 
not capital ships! While superficially 
this may seem to strengthen Watts’s 
case, it actually weakens his argument 
in a number of important ways� Most 
obviously, it might be construed that it 
is the very notion of a “capital” ship, as 
distinct from any other, that is obsolete 
in this case, not the U�S� Navy’s long 
adherence to the principles of a theorist 
writing in an era in which there was a 
clear distinction� If the capital ship idea 
is truly dead and the distinction is no 
longer valid or recognized today, where 
would Watts’s argument be then? It also 
weakens the assertion he makes later 
on that other navies have done a better 
job of letting go of the capital ship than 
the U�S� Navy� While I can think of a 
number of navies that have abandoned 
aircraft carriers and battleships, on 
account of the expenses involved, very 
few, I think, have abandoned the DDG 
or the advanced FFG as the prime 
movers of global influence� If, using his 
logic, these are in fact capital ships, then 
most navies would seem to be following 
a trajectory remarkably similar to that 
of the United States� Interestingly too, 
Watts seems not to include nuclear 
submarines in this mix, yet I know of at 
least one navy—the United Kingdom’s 
Royal Navy—that has often equated 
these vessels to the capital ships of yore 
on account of their immense power-
projection and antifleet capabilities�
The second difficulty is the author’s 
assumption that Mahan’s theories on 
decisive battle and his capital ship theory 
are synonymous and interchangeable� 
Mahan, of course, was writing about the 
preindustrial age and in an era when 
the only threat to that determinant of 
naval power, the battleship, was another 
battleship� Under those circumstances, 
the possession of the most up-to-date 
and powerful fleet of battleships that 
one could afford made a lot of sense, 
as did the exhortation to keep the fleet 
concentrated� The advent of the indus-
trial age changed all this, however, in 
two important ways� First, the extreme 
mobility conferred on smaller ships by 
turbine propulsion and the development 
of new weapons such as the Whitehead 
torpedo made the battleships vulnerable 
to smaller platforms that cost a fraction 
of a battleship’s cost� This was perhaps 
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the first time in naval history when a 
third-rate navy might threaten the larg-
est fleets in the world effectively� Second, 
the industrial powers’ need for resources 
and markets on a global scale widened 
the scope of naval strategic responsi-
bilities immeasurably� This navies were 
slow to appreciate, but (to cut a long 
story very short) the likes of Admiral 
Fisher in Britain with his battle cruiser 
ideas in 1905 and Admiral Fournier 
in France with his general-purpose 
cruisers (“bon à tout faire”—able to 
do anything) a few years earlier slowly 
but inexorably moved the focus away 
from a defensive clash of battle fleets 
around the point of decision toward 
the use of offensive power-projection 
fleets around the periphery to ensure 
protection of these wider strategic 
interests� This offensive approach was 
taken up most notably by the carrier 
power-projection fleets of the U�S� Navy 
in the post–World War II era� In other 
words, the “capital ship theory” that the 
U�S� Navy has held dear through all these 
years is this offensive power-projection 
version, not the original Mahanian 
ideas of a half-century earlier� Watts 
does not make this distinction clear�
Watts’s third discontinuity, which is 
more of an omission than anything 
else, is his lack of consideration of 
network-centric warfare (NCW) as a 
possible alternative to his capital ship 
theory� While he mentions the concept 
very briefly in passing (p� 129), he 
chooses not to explain that it actually 
argues against capital ship theory by 
maintaining that, in this era of reliable 
and near-instantaneous data sharing, it 
is the integrity of the network among the 
various platforms that is vital, not the 
security of any individual unit attached 
to it� No one ship needs to have all the 
“sensors and shooters” in a discrete 
package if each can draw what it lacks 
from the others in the network� This 
again makes it something of an antithe-
sis of capital ship theory, considering the 
latter’s focus on the platforms involved� 
As such, the NCW concept is worthy of 
inclusion here, if only to explore why 
the U�S� Navy supposedly rejected it 
(although aspects of it have survived in 
the current “distributed lethality” idea)�
In the end, this reviewer was not 
persuaded by the arguments as 
presented, but this in no way should 
be taken as a rejection of the book’s 
core idea itself� Watts’s volume is 
valuable insofar as it encourages the 
reader to think of alternative organiza-
tional strategies for the U�S� Navy; it is, 
however, incomplete, in that formulating 
a comprehensive conclusion requires 
the three objections discussed above to 
be addressed at some point� The book 
also does not offer any defense for 
the generalist position and the many 
virtues of capable, multipurpose ships 
across the range of military operations, 
nor any alternative to this force, which 
presumably would have to include a 
larger number of specialist platforms� 
One hopes this will form a new point of 
departure for future work in this area�
ANGUS ROSS
Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Fu-
ture, by Henry D� Sokolski� 2nd ed� Carlisle Bar-
racks, PA: U�S� Army War College Press, 2015� 
159 pages� Free�
Henry Sokolski has been a fixture of 
Washington’s nuclear nonproliferation 
community for several decades and in 
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